













































Authorisation in Grid computing
David Chadwick*
University of Salford, UK
Abstract This paper briefly surveys how authorisation in Grid computing has
evolved during the last few years, and presents the latest developments in which
Grid applications can utilise a policy controlled authorisation infrastructure to
make decisions about which users are allowed to perform which actions on which
Grid resources. The paper describes the Global Grid Forum SAML interface for
connecting policy based authorisation infrastructures to Grid applications, and then
describes the PERMIS authorisation infrastructure which has implemented this
interface. The paper concludes with suggestions about how this work will evolve in
the future.






























Grid computing allows resources, including large
scale expensive ones such as genetic databases, to
be shared between members of virtual organisa-
tions (VOs). However, if an organisation is to allow
its resources to be shared amongst its V partners,
it needs to be able to determine who is authorised
to access these resources in which ways, and who
is not. Ideally each resource owner should be able
to set the policy determining the rules for who is
authorised to do what, and then leave the author-
isation infrastructure to enforce this policy. The
resource owner should not be expected to
* Present address: Computing Laboratory, University of Kent,
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doi:10.1016/j.istr.2004.11.004individually identify and name each VO user who
is to access his/her resource, as this soon becomes
unwieldy and costly to manage. The resource
owner should be able to delegate to other partners
in the VO the ability to identify and nominate the
users from their respective domain who are to be
allowed to use his/her resource, leaving him/her
to simply determine what type of access to grant
to the different categories of user. It is only very
recently that we have been able to achieve this, as
will be described here.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows.
Next section provides a brief history of Grid
authorisation. Then the current Global Grid Forum
draft authorisation interface is described. Further
the PERMIS policy based authorisation infrastruc-
ture that is compatible with the GGF interface is
described. Finally last section concludes and looks
























































































































A brief history of Grid authorisation
One of the earliest attempts at providing author-
isation in VOs was in the form of the Globus Toolkit
Gridmap files (Sotomayor). This file simply holds
a list of the authenticated distinguished names of
the Grid users and the equivalent local user
account names that they are to be mapped into.
Access control to a resource is then left up to the
local operating system and application access
control mechanisms. As can be seen, this neither
allows the local resource administrator to set
a policy for who is allowed to do what, nor does
it minimise his/her workload. On the contrary it
maximises the work of the resource administrator
since (s)he must first pre-configure the Grid appli-
cation with the names of every VO user who is to
be allowed to access the Grid resource, and then
(s)he must set the access controls on the local
operating system and/or application to ensure that
the local user names are restricted in what they
are allowed to do with the resource. The system is
neither scalable nor flexible, and there is no way
to distribute the administrative task throughout
the VO. Consequently several ways were devel-
oped to improve upon this.
The Community Authorisation Service (CAS)
(Pearlman et al., 2002) was the next attempt by
the Globus team to improve upon the manage-
ability of user authorisation. CAS allows a resource
owner to grant access to a portion of his/her
resource to a VO (or community e hence the name
CAS), and then let the community determine who
can use this allocation. The resource owner thus
partially delegates the allocation of authorisation
rights to the community. This is achieved by having
a CAS server, which acts as a trusted intermediary
between VO users and resources. Users first con-
tact the CAS asking for permission to use a Grid
resource. The CAS consults its policy (which
specifies who has permission to do what on which
resources) and if granted, returns a digitally self-
signed capability to the user optionally containing
policy details about what the user is allowed to do
(as an opaque string). The user then contacts the
resource and presents this capability. The resource
checks that the capability is signed by a known and
trusted CAS and if so maps the CAS’s distinguished
name into a local user account name via the
Gridmap file. Consequently the Gridmap file now
only needs to contain the name of the trusted CAS
servers and not all the VO users. This substantially
reduces the work of the resource administrator.
Further, determining who should be granted capa-








managers in the VO community, so this again
relieves the burden of resource managers. For
finer grained access control, the resource can
additionally call a further routine, passing to it
the opaque policy string from the capability, and
using the returned value to refine the access rights
of the user. Unfortunately this part of the CAS
implementation (policy definition and evaluation
routine) was never fully explored and developed
by the Globus team. Research by other groups into
policy controlled authorisation infrastructures
overtook the CAS work.
European researchers were never content with
the capabilities of either the manually generated
Gridmap file or the CAS. Consequently the EU
DataGrid and DataTAG projects developed the
Virtual Organisation Membership Service (VOMS)
(Alfieri et al., 2003) as a way of delegating the
authorisation of users to managers in the VO. VOMS
has gone through a number of iterations in its
development. Initially it was a system for dynam-
ically creating Gridmap files from LDAP directories
containing details about VO users. Resources could
pull a Gridmap file from this periodically. Thus the
resource owner never had to actually create or
manage the Gridmap file. This system, however,
was not scalable. The EU work then evolved into
a push system in which the VOMS server digitally
signed a ‘‘pseudo-certificate’’ for the VO user to
present to the resource. This pseudo-certificate
could contain a local user account name, in which
case no Gridmap file would be needed, or it could
contain other privileges or group membership de-
tails, in which case software would be needed by
the resource to interpret this information and
grant appropriate rights. The software they de-
veloped for this is called the Local Centre Author-
isation Service (LCAS) (Steenbakkers, 2003). LCAS
makes its authorisation decision based upon the
user’s certificate and the job specification, which
is written in job description language (JDL) format.
In its current re-incarnation, the VOMS server
now produces short-lived X.509 attribute certifi-
cates (ACs) (ISO 9594-8/ITU Rec. X.509, 2001) for
the user to push to the resource. This design is
similar in concept to the CAS, but differs in
message format and syntax. In VOMS the name of
the user is presented to the resource instead of the
name of the CAS server, and user attributes are
presented instead of opaque policy statements.
The message construct is signed by the VOMS server
instead of the CAS server, and is a standard X.509
AC instead of a proprietary capability. However,
what neither VOMS nor CAS nor LCAS provides is the
































































































policy for access to his/her resource and then let
the authorisation infrastructure enforce this policy
on his/her behalf. This is what systems like Akenti
(Johnston et al., 1998), PERMIS (Chadwick et al.,
2003), and Keynote (Blaze et al., 1999) provide.
The Globus team realised that ultimately this is
what is needed for Grid authorisation, and so,
within the remit of the Global Grid Forum (GGF),
set about defining a standard interface between
a Grid application that wants to know if a user is
authorised to perform a certain action, and an
authorisation infrastructure that is able to answer
such questions.
An authorisation interface for the Grid
The ISO Access Control Framework standard (ITU-T
Rec X.812, 1995) recognised nearly a decade ago
that access control can be split into two compo-
nents: an application dependent enforcement
function (AEF) and an application independent
decision function (ADF) e termed, respectively,
the policy enforcement point (PEP) and policy
decision point (PDP) in various IETF documents.
The PDP (or ADF) can be controlled by a policy (or
set of rules), and providing the policy is general
enough, the PDP is able to make decisions for any
type of application. All the ADF needs in addition
to the policy is details about the user (initiator),
the resource being protected (target), the access
request and environmental (or contextual) infor-
mation such as the time of day (see Fig. 1). In
addition, if the ADF/PDP retains information about
previous requested actions it can make subsequent
decision based on this, for example, ATM machines
that will only allow you to withdraw a maximum
amount of money each day and will refuse re-













Figure 1 Separating access control enforcement from








1Group defined an Application Programmable In-
1terface between the PEP and PDP and called it the
1AZN API (The Open Group, 2000). However, this is
1not general purpose enough, being constrained
1to C programs only.
1The Grid is increasingly moving towards web
1services as the means of connecting its various
1components together. Globus Toolkit is moving this
1way too, and release 4 scheduled for the end of
12004, is expected to be web services compliant. In
12003 it was therefore opportune to specify a web
1services interface that could be used to connect
1a PDP to a Grid based PEP such as Globus Toolkit.
1Fortunately the groundwork for this had already
1been done by the Organization for the Advance-
1ment of Structured Information Standards (OASIS),
1who had issued the Security Assertion Markup
1Language (SAML) specification in 2002 (OASIS,
12002a). SAML is a general purpose language that
1allows different types of security assertions about
1principals to be passed between clients and serv-
1ers, encoded as XML messages. The language is
1infinitely extensible and allows any type of asser-
1tion to be defined, although three standard types
1of assertions about principals were specified in
1SAML v1.0: authentication assertions, attribute
1assertions and authorisation decision assertions.
1It is the latter type that are passed between the
1PDP and PEP. SAML therefore provides a solid base
1from which to specify the PDPePEP interface for
1Grid applications. The SAML specification also
1defines a requesteresponse protocol in SOAP over
1HTTP for carrying the SAML assertions. SAML is thus
1fully web services compliant.
1Whilst SAML provides a solid basis for specifying
1the PDPePEP interface, it does not define every-
1thing that is needed for Grid applications. A SAML
1profile is thus needed to rectify the deficiencies,
1and this has been specified by the Global Grid
1Forum as a draft standard specification (Von Welch
1et al., 2004). Several important restrictions or
1additions to SAML have been specified, including:
- The contents of the authorisation response. A
simple Boolean (granted or denied) is sufficient
for the PDPePEP interface, but SAML does not
contain such a response,1 hence the GGF
profile defines one.
- How the PDP gains access to the user’s author-









1 The SAML Authorization Decision Response repeats the
entire contents of the Authorisation Decision Request, which
is useful if the request is sent by a party other than the PEP, for
example, the principal. The SAML response thus details exactly


















































































































modes are possible, pull and push. In pull mode
the PDP fetches the credentials, in push mode
the PEP provides them. If the PDP is to fetch
the credentials, how does it know where to get
them from? The PDP could either be pre-
configured with a (probably static) list of
credential sources, or the client could tell the
server where to pull the credentials from at the
time of decision making. The latter is more
scalable, and more dynamic than the former.
Thus the GGF profile defines a Reference
Statement which points to a repository where
user credentials are located.
- Default values for all the parameters of the
authorisation decision request. These are
specified in the GGF draft as follows: if the
name of the initiator is missing it is assumed to
be anyone i.e. public access is being re-
quested; if the requested action is missing it
is assumed to be everything i.e. all the rights
that have been granted to the initiator; if the
target is missing it is assumed to be all the
resources that are protected by the PDP policy;
if the initiator’s credentials are missing then
only the default ones (if any) that have been
granted to everyone should be used. Note that
no default values for the contextual informa-
tion have been specified since in general it is
not possible to define these.
- If too little information is passed to the PDP, it
may simply deny access. Alternatively, at its
discretion, the PDP may return ‘‘Granted sub-
ject to’’ along with a set of conditions that
must be fulfilled before access is granted, e.g.,
Granted subject to the time being between 9
am and 5 pm. It is then the responsibility of the
PEP to evaluate these conditions before grant-
ing access to the initiator. If the PEP is unable
or unwilling to evaluate these conditions, it
always has the option of issuing a new decision
request and sending more information to
the PDP (such as the missing contextual
information).
Once this interface had been defined by the
GGF, it then needed to be implemented and tested
in one or more Grid applications to ensure that it
meets the needs of the Grid community. Globus
Toolkit v3.3, released in April 2004, has imple-
mented this SAML interface, as has the PERMIS
authorization infrastructure, described in the next
section. The BRIDGES E-Science project currently
running at Glasgow University is the first Grid
application to pilot the combined GT3.3/PERMIS
infrastructure and the results are expected to be








The PERMIS authorisation infrastructure
PERMIS is software developed under the EC PERMIS
project (www.permis.org). It is now part of the US
National Science Foundation’s Middleware Initia-
tive (NMI) software release (www.nsf-middleware.
org). PERMIS is an attribute based access control
(ABAC) infrastructure. ABAC is a superset of role
based access controls (RBAC), in which access
control decisions are made based upon any attrib-
utes held by the user, and not just upon their
organisational roles (as in conventional RBAC). In
PERMIS, user attributes are held in X.509 standard
attribute certificates (ACs) (ISO 9594-8/ITU Rec.
X.509, 2001). An attribute certificate is a data
structure that binds details about the holder to the
attributes that are assigned to them, digitally
signed by the issuing attribute authority. The AC
is therefore tamper-proof, and its validity can be
checked by validating its digital signature, and
checking that it has not been previously revoked in
the current revocation list.
In PERMIS, managers throughout a VO can act as
attribute authorities and assign attributes (in the
form of X.509 ACs) to their staff e they do not
need any prior permission to do this. All they need
is a private signing key and a corresponding X.509
public key certificate (plus the necessary software
to create ACs). Thus the allocation of entitlements
(or ACs) is distributed throughout the entire VO
(and beyond if necessary2). However, each re-
source owner, when setting the policy that con-
trols access to his/her Grid resource, states which
attribute authorities (s)he trusts to issue X.509
ACs, and the PERMIS PDP will then discard all ACs
presented to it that are not digitally signed by one
of these trusted authorities. Thus we have partly
accomplished one of our earlier stated goals, i.e.
that a resource owner should be able to specify
a policy for controlling access to his/her resource,
and then leave the authorisation infrastructure to
enforce it.
The PERMIS distribution contains three software
tools for creating X.509 ACs. A user friendly graph-
ical Attribute Certificate Manager (see Fig. 2)
is designed to make it very easy for managers to
assign basic ACs to their staff, one by one. A more
sophisticated Privilege Allocator can create more
complex ACs, whilst a bulk loader tool is designed to
allow large numbers of users to be automatically
2 PERMIS does not restrict who can issues ACs. Thus, for
example, a professional society such as the Law Society or the
General Medical Council, could issue ‘‘lawyer’’ or ‘‘doctor’’ ACs
to their members, and access control decisions could sub-






































































allocated ACs. The bulk loader works by searching
an LDAP directory for users who have specific
attributes, then creating a specific AC for each of
them and writing these back to their respective
LDAP entries.
PERMIS provides a PDP that reads in the policy
set by the resource owner at initialisation time. It
then makes access control decisions for each
authorisation decision request provided by the
PEP, based on this policy. The interface between
the PDP and the PEP is implemented as a Java API
(for applications that want to combine the PDP and
PEP as one program), and as SAML requests over
SOAP and HTTP (for stand alone PDP servers, as
used by GT3.3).
The user’s X.509 ACs can be pushed to the
PERMIS PDP by the PEP, either as complete X.509
ACs, or as SAML Reference Statements. The PDP
can also pull X.509 ACs from a set of pre-config-
ured LDAP servers, or from the locations specified
in the Reference Statements.
PERMIS policies are written in XML, according to
a DTD published at www.xml.org. This DTD pre-
dates the XACML specification (OASIS, 2000b), and
for the most part is a subset of XACML, except that
the PERMIS policy supports delegation of authority,
a feature not currently supported by XACML. TheISTR4_proof  31 JanTPERMIS authorisation policy is a set of sub-policies,
namely:
 SubjectPolicy e this specifies the valid subject
domains i.e. only users from these subject
domains may be authorised to access resources
covered by this policy. Each domain is specified
as an LDAP subtree, using Include DN and
Exclude DN statements. In Grid environments
each user has a unique DN contained in his
public key certificate. If his DN is not within
a valid subject domain, the user will be denied
all access to resources in the VO covered by
this policy.
 RoleHierarchyPolicy e this specifies the differ-
ent roles and attributes that can be allocated
to users, and the hierarchical relationships (if
any) between them. A superior role inherits all
the privileges of a subordinate role, as in
conventional RBAC. Using role hierarchies can
simplify Role Assignment Policies.
 SOAPolicy e this specifies which attribute
authorities (or Sources Of Authority) are
trusted to allocate roles and attributes to
users. This is the way that a resource owner
specifies who within (and without) the VO is to













































6 D. Chadwick RoleAssignmentPolicy e this specifies which
roles and attributes may be allocated to which
subjects by which SOAs, whether delegation of
authority may take place or not, and how long
the issued ACs are considered valid by this
policy. This sub-policy effectively states who is
trusted to allocate which roles to whom, and is
central to the distributed management of
trust. It can stop a trusted manager in one
organisation issuing attributes or roles to staff
in another organisation. Allowing delegation
will allow a staff member to assign his/her
attributes to another staff member. By re-
stricting the validity of ACs, an issued AC may
have a validity period of 2 years, but the
resource owner may have a more stringent
policy and be not prepared to accept ACs older
than 1 year.
 TargetPolicy e this specifies the target domains
in which resources covered by this policy are




LDAP subtree, using Include DN and Exclude DN
statements, or as a URL. Resources can further
be refined by specifying their type e.g. all
fileservers within the oZ Salford, cZGB
domain.
 ActionPolicy e this specifies the actions (or
methods) supported by the various target
resources, along with the parameters that
should be passed along with each request e.g.
action Open with parameter Filename.
 TargetAccessPolicy e this specifies which roles
and attributes are needed in order to perform
which actions on which targets, and under
which conditions. Note that this part of the
policy, being ABAC, is not concerned with the
distinguished names of the users. Conditions
are specified using Boolean logic and might
contain constraints such as ‘‘IF time is GT 9 am
AND time is LT 5 pm OR IF Calling IP address is
a subset of 125.67.x.x’’. All actions that are not




































































































































Clearly setting the policy for controlling access
to a resource is a potentially complex task,
especially if the resource owner was required to
write the XML to specify it. This would be beyond
the capabilities of most resource owners. Conse-
quently, a user friendly GUI is provided to make it
easy to write PERMIS policies (see Fig. 3). Once the
policy is written, the resource owner digitally signs
it (to prevent it from being subsequently tampered
with), and the GUI stores it in the owner’s LDAP
directory entry. Each policy also has a unique ID so
that an owner can have several different policies
for different occasions. When the PERMIS PDP is
started it is told which policy ID to use, so it reads
in this policy from the owner’s LDAP entry, checks
the signature and validity time, and if valid, the
PDP knows that it has the correct policy written by
the resource owner. The resource owner can then
leave the authorisation infrastructure to control
access to his/her resource without having to
continually manage the system.
Conclusions and future work
Allowing a resource owner to set the policy for who
has permission to perform which actions on which
resource, and distributing the assignment of rights
to managers throughout a VO, is clearly something
that is needed to facilitate large scale Grid com-
puting. Separating access control enforcement
into a policy controlled application independent
PDP and application dependent PEP, linked togeth-
er via a web services SAML interface is something
that will facilitate the development of compre-
hensive and sophisticated PDPs such as PERMIS and
Akenti. As Grid resource owners demand more
access control features, such as separation of
duties, mutually exclusive roles, dynamic delega-
tion of authority, etc., then it becomes a question
of adding suitable rules to the policy base and
enhancing the PDP to correctly evaluate them.
At this point in time it is not clear which XML
based policy language will become the de-facto
standard for PDPs. XACML (OASIS, 2000b), from
OASIS has some industry support, and Grid re-
searchers are now experimenting with it. But
Microsoft is also championing XrML (www.xrml.org)
as a general purpose language for expressing who
has the right to do what with digital content.
Clearly there is significant overlap between these
two languages, but with XrML now being part of
Microsoft Office 2003 and Windows Server 2003, it
could very well become the de-facto standard








a number of its features are patented, so users will
need to pay a license fee to use it.
Future work inside the GGF is likely to specify
a management interface to the PDP that will allow
the resource manager to dynamically update the
policy that is to be used for decision making. In
current systems it is a local matter how the PDP is
configured with the correct policy to be used, and
how the policy is changed according to the chang-
ing circumstances in the VO. Further, in the future,
autonomic PDPs could well be developed and
configured with meta-policies telling them which
access control policy to use under which condi-
tions. As one can see, policy based authorisation
and access controls are definitely here to stay.
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